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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Scott Jeffery Sams appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict
finding him guilty of disturbing the peace.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The following testimony was presented at trial:
T.O., an adult male, had been acquainted with Sams for a few years, and went to
Sams’ house for a couple of nights in January 2015 because he needed a place to stay.
(Tr., p.128, L.24 – p.131, L.8; p.157, Ls.10-13.) One morning, as T.O. helped Sams
clean his room, Sams got mad at T.O. and accused him of stealing some pills. (Tr.,
p.133, L.12 – p.134, L.2.) T.O. repeatedly denied taking any of Sams’ pills, and as T.O.
started to remove his jacket, Sams held a knife up, and the two continued to argue.
(Tr., p.135, L.13 – p.136, L.10.) Sams told T.O. he was going to “gut [him] like a pig”
and “came at [him]” holding the knife in his hand. (Tr., p.136, Ls.10-25.) T.O. backed
up into a corner and denied taking any pills as Sams accused and threatened him. (Tr.,
p.137, Ls.5-10.) While T.O. was in the corner, Sams said he was going to kill him. (Tr.,
p. 138, L.17 – p.139, L.8.) After T.O. offered to have Sams check him, Sams told T.O.
he may have “keistered” the pills (T.O. explained that “keister” means “[p]ut them up my
butt”), and made T.O. remove all of his clothing except his socks. (Tr., p.137, L.15 – p.
138, L.8.) Sams again came at T.O. with the knife and attempted to stab him. (Tr.,
p.138, Ls.6-24.)
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T.O. tried unsuccessfully to calm Sams down, and when Sams lunged at T.O.
with the knife again, T.O. grabbed Sams’ arm and struggled with Sams until he was
able to hit Sams’ arm against a wall and free the knife from Sams’ grasp and recover it
himself. (Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.141, L.7.) At that point, Sams “started screaming saying,
help; he’s trying to kill me. Help. Help.” (Tr., p.141, Ls.9-10.) T.O. retreated backwards
toward the living room, where he saw Sams’ roommate, and left the house through the
front door as Sams continued to angrily approach him. (Tr., p.141, Ls.10-23.)
T.O. went outside the house, tossed the knife towards a tree by a fence, and sat
in front of the house dressed only in socks. (Tr., p.142, Ls.12-24.) While T.O. asked
Sams’ roommate to get his “stuff,” Sams went into the garage and grabbed a shovel.
(Tr., p.142, Ls.14-17.)

Before police arrived, Sams tossed a few articles of T.O.’s

clothing outside the house and T.O. put them on. (Tr., p.146, L.3 – p.147, L.3; p.170,
Ls.3-11.) When the police arrived, T.O. told them about the incident. (Tr., p.150, L.6 –
p.151, L.18.) T.O. noticed he had a slight cut on his arm and several scratches on his
hand and neck. (Tr., p.147, L.4 – p. 148, L.15.) Police officers later recovered the knife
lying on the ground in the front yard. (Tr., p.203, Ls.4-20.)
Greg Prickett testified that he rented a room to Sams a couple of months before
the incident, and that on the morning it occurred, he was going into the house when he
heard the two men arguing about missing pills as they wrestled and fought in a
bedroom. (Tr., p.187, L.2 – p.188, L.24.) The bedroom door opened and Prickett saw a
naked man running with a knife, who was being chased by Sams. (Tr., p.189, Ls.4-14.)
Sams appeared to be angry and “the other person just was trying to calm him down.”
(Tr., p.189, Ls.22-23.) Sams went into the garage and grabbed a shovel, and the
2

“naked man” backed out onto the front step of the house. (Tr., p. 190, Ls.15-18.) Sams
angrily accused Prickett of taking his pills, so Prickett locked himself in his own
bedroom, called 911 and stayed on the line until officers responded and walked him out
of the house. (Tr., p.191, L.9 – p.192, L.6.)
Sams testified that he and T.O. arranged for a sex hookup through a gay social
media site and T.O. stayed at Sams’ house for a couple of days; while T.O. was visiting,
Sams noticed that his costly prescription drugs (including HIV meds) were missing; T.O.
became very violent during their argument over the missing prescription drugs; T.O.
stripped willingly to prove to Sams that he did not steal any drugs; Sams grabbed his
“show knife” in self-defense as T.O. was shaking and hitting him; T.O. again attacked
Sams, and as they struggled, T.O. got the knife and held it at Sams’ chin, cutting it
slightly; the two struggled down the hall, and when Sams went to the garage and got a
shovel for his own protection, T.O. ran out the front door. (Tr., p.262, L.24 – p.294,
L.18.)
The state charged Sams with aggravated assault and use of a deadly weapon in
the commission of a crime. (R., pp.30-31.) After jury selection, Sams’ attorney asked
the court to preclude the state from presenting testimony about the lengthy police
standoff that occurred after the incident, when Sams remained inside his house for a
number of hours. (Tr., p.109, L.22 – p.110, L.4.) In the state’s offer of proof, the
prosecutor said:
Your Honor, what the state intends to present is that there was this
initial incident. Law enforcement was called. Attempts were made to
contact the defendant. He simply wasn’t answering his phone. Her [sic]
wasn’t responsive to other means to get him out of the house, and it did
3

require, really, a fairly substantial law enforcement presence for a number
of hours including the blocking off streets.
I don’t necessarily have to get into the detail of blocking off of
streets, but I do think it’s good consciousness of guilt evidence tending to
show that he didn’t want to come out, he didn’t want to talk to the officers,
and, certainly, if there’s going to be any sort of case presented that, gosh,
the cops got the wrong guy, then, I certainly think that it is relevant for the
state to be able to present that.
(Tr., p.110, Ls.8-23.) A bit later in the discussion, the prosecutor further explained:
Well, the defendant didn’t make statements. It’s just the fact that
attempts were made to contact him. Multiple attempts were made to
contact him. Officers were attempting to call his cell phone after getting
his phone number from either the roommate or the victim. He did not
answer his phone. They had to toss a throw phone through one of the
windows. He did not respond to calls on that.
They were on the scene for, I believe, seven hours.[1] I would have
to look at the CAD log for exact times, but I think we’re in the seven-hour
range before he eventually exited the residence and then came outside,
and, at that time, he did exercise his right not to speak to law enforcement.
(Tr., p.111, L.23 – p.112, L.11.)
The district court brought up the applicability of Rule 404(b), and initially ruled the
state could present standoff testimony for non-character purposes such as identity and
absence of mistake or accident.

(Tr., p.113, L.22 – p.114, L.6.)

The court also

explained that the contested testimony was not unduly prejudicial to Sams under I.R.E.
403, and was “part and parcel of the offense[.]” (Id.) Sams’ trial counsel argued that,
because the standoff testimony was being offered under Rule 404(b), the state was
required to provide notice. (Tr., p.114, Ls.24-25.) The prosecutor responded, “it’s all
part and parcel to this incident, and so I don’t think there’s any need for the state to

1

The prosecutor and the court subsequently determined that Sams left the house
about five hours after police were called to the scene. (Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.12.)
4

show anything beyond this is what happened here. Certainly, this is what happened
directly after, as law enforcement’s getting on scene.” (Tr., p.117, Ls.5-12.) Sams’ trial
counsel objected to the offered testimony on the basis that it was irrelevant and
prejudicial.

(Tr., p.118, Ls.9-10.)

When the court asked the prosecutor why the

testimony would not be “propensity evidence,” she explained that it “goes to show his
then existing state of mind.” (Tr., p.117, Ls.13-22.)
The district court rejected the prosecutor’s “existing state of mind” purpose for
admitting testimony about the standoff, and also precluded any mention of “SWAT” and
the “blocking off of streets.” (Tr., p.114, Ls.7-18; p.119, L.16 – p.120, L.11.) However,
the court allowed the state to present testimony that police made numerous attempts to
contact Sams after the incident, and that he subsequently left the house and was taken
into custody. (Tr., p.119, L.9 - p.120, L.25.) The court held such testimony was neither
character evidence nor “404(b) evidence for which [the state] did not present notice.”
(Tr., p.119, Ls.13-15.) In keeping with the court’s ruling, Officer Rush testified at trial
that Sams repeatedly failed to respond to police attempts to contact him and to have
him leave the house, but Sams “eventually” left the house and was taken into custody.
(Tr., p.198, L.10 – p.199, L.5; p.205, L.16 – p.207, L.14.)
The jury acquitted Sams of the two felonies and convicted him of disturbing the
peace. (R., p.159.) The district court sentenced Sams to 180 days jail, with credit for
107 days served, and suspended the balance. (R., p.163.) The court placed Sams on
supervised probation for two years. (Id.) Sams timely appealed. (R., pp.168-170.)

5

ISSUE
Sams states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the
standoff between Mr. Sams and the police on the basis it was not Idaho
Criminal Rule 404(b) evidence, despite the court’s earlier ruling the
evidence was Rue 404(b) evidence?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Sams failed to show error in the district court’s admission of testimony that
Sams did not immediately respond to law enforcement’s attempts to contact him but that
he eventually came out of the house and was taken into custody?
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ARGUMENT
Sams Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Admission Of Testimony That
Sams Did Not Immediately Respond To Law Enforcement’s Attempts To Contact Him
But That He Eventually Came Out Of The House And Was Taken Into Custody
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Sams “asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted

evidence of the standoff on the basis it was not Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b)
evidence, because the court earlier ruled the standoff was Rule 404(b) evidence.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) Sams argues that, because the evidence was subject to Rule
404(b), it was inadmissible because the state failed to serve notice of its intent to admit
it. (Id.) Sams further contends the district court’s “ultimate determination admitting the
standoff evidence on the basis it was not Rule 404(b) evidence . . . was arbitrary and
outside the boundaries of the court’s discretion[,]” and not harmless. (Id.)
Sams’ arguments fail because: (1) The res gestae exception to Rule 404(b) and
“consciousness of guilt” were the bases for the district court’s admission of limited
testimony about how Sams avoided contact with police after the incident and was taken
into custody later that day, and Sams has not provided any argument and authority to
show that either ground was incorrect, (2) the district court’s admission of testimony
about Sams’ avoidance of police was proper under both the res gestae and
“consciousness of guilt” grounds, and Sams’ argument that the court’s ruling was
arbitrary is baseless, and (3) even if the district court erred in admitting testimony about
the “standoff,” such error was harmless.

7

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).

Relevance is a

question of law reviewed de novo whereas the determination of whether the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185,
1187 (2009).
C.

Sams Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The District Court’s Admission Of
Testimony About Sams’ Avoidance Of Police And Eventual Arrest, And Even If
The Admission Was Error, It Was Harmless
1.

This Court Should Decline To Consider This Issue Because Sams Has
Not Presented Argument And Authority Challenging The District Court’s
Res Gestae And “Consciousness Of Guilt” Rulings

A review of the record shows that, although the district court used different
terminology, it relied in part upon the “complete story principle” (or “res gestae
principle”), in its two rulings on Sams’ objection to the state’s introduction of “standoff”
evidence. In its final ruling, the court also relied upon the “consciousness of guilt” basis
for admitting testimony of the “standoff.” Because Sams has not presented argument
and authority challenging either basis for the admission of such testimony, this Court
should decline to consider the issue.
One exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of other misconduct evidence is res
gestae, or the “complete story principle,” where “the charged act and the uncharged act
are so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete
8

presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged misconduct.”
State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 19, 878 P.2d 188, 193 (Ct. App. 1994). As the Idaho
Supreme Court explained in State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110
(1975):
The state is entitled to present a full and accurate account of the
circumstances of the commission of the crime, and if such an account also
implicates the defendant or defendants in the commission of other crimes for
which they have not been charged, the evidence is nevertheless admissible.
The jury is entitled to base its decision upon a full and accurate description of
the events concerning the whole criminal act, regardless of whether such a
description also implicates a defendant in other criminal acts.
See also McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (7th ed. 1999) (“other-crime evidence should
be admissible to complete the story…when the material in question is necessary to a
fair understanding of the behavior of the individuals involved in the criminal enterprise or
the events immediately leading up to them.”) (footnotes omitted).
Having sua sponte brought up the applicability of Rule 404(b) to the issue, the
district court stated in its initial ruling:
Given the state’s offer of proof, I do find that there’s sufficient facts
to find this did exist. While he’s not charged with resisting and obstructing,
it could be perceived as another wrong or act under Rule 404.
I do find under Rule 404(b) that this information is, not just to prove
the character of Mr. Sams, but it is admissible for another purpose
including the identity or the absence of mistake or accident in this
particular fact [sic] given the state’s offer of proof, so I will permit it under
Rule 403. I do not find that this information is unduly prejudicial to the
defendant. It is part and parcel of the offense, and he had not invoked his
right to remain silent, so I don’t believe it is commenting on his right to
silence.
(Tr., p.113, L.17 – p.114, L.6 (emphasis added).) The above comments show that one
of the two bases of the district court’s initial ruling to allow testimony about the standoff
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was that it was “part and parcel of the offense” (id.), which is a plain reference to the res
gestae principle.
In its second and final ruling on the admissibility of "standoff” testimony, the
district court basically repeated its earlier conclusion that Sams’ delay in leaving his
house (i.e., the standoff) was part and parcel of the facts of the crime, and showed his
“consciousness of guilt,” to wit:
However, I do agree that there is certain components of the delay in
coming out of the residence, which are consciousness of guilt are parcel
to the facts of the crime. I do not agree, I mean, he clearly could have
been charged with resisting and obstructing. He’s not charged. The state
had the opportunity to charge that conduct, and they did not.
So, to the extent the evidence that the state puts on is that they
made numerous attempts to contact him, he did not answer, and,
ultimately, they threw a phone through the window to try to make contact
with him. I will permit that evidence and testimony because I don’t think
that that is character or 404(b) evidence for which they did not present
notice.
To the extent the state subscribes some state of mind of the
defendant to that as being anti-authoritarian or willing to resist police, they
did not give intent to produce it for those purposes, so I’m not going to
permit it to that level of detail that we show that he was being contrary,
anti-authoritarian, resisting, delaying or obstructing officers in the
performance of their duties because I don’t believe that they gave notice
of that, so I will permit it for that very limited purpose.
(Tr., p.118, L.20 – p.119, L.25 (emphasis added).) The district court’s comment that “I
do agree that there is certain components of the delay in coming out of the residence,
which are consciousness of guilt are parcel to the facts of the crime” (id.) appears to
have been in reference to (and agreement with) the prosecutor’s response to the 404(b)
“notice” issue, when she stated:
I’m not fairly [sic] sure why it would be 404(b), as it’s all part and
parcel to this incident, and so I don’t think there’s any need for the state to
10

show anything beyond this is what happened here. Certainly, this is what
happened directly after, as law enforcement’s getting on scene. The
roommate’s even still in the house. I mean, this is all the same incident.
(Tr., p.117, Ls.5-12 (emphasis added).) The

district

court’s

two

rulings

and

its

agreement with the prosecutor’s comments show that its decision to admit testimony
about the standoff was based on the res gestae exception to Rule 404(b) and Sams’
“consciousness of guilt.”
On appeal, Sams has not presented argument and authority to show that the
district court’s reliance on either the res gestae principle or the “consciousness of guilt”
ground is erroneous.

(See generally Appellant’s Brief.)

Because Sams has not

explained and presented authority showing how the district court erred by admitting the
standoff testimony pursuant to either ground, his issue should not be considered. See
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on
appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be
considered.”). See also State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313
(Ct. App. 1998) (where a basis for a trial court’s ruling is not challenged on appeal, an
appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis).
2.

The District Court’s Admission Of Testimony About Sams’ Avoidance Of
Police And Subsequent Arrest Was Proper Under Both The Res Gestae
And “Consciousness Of Guilt” Grounds, And Sams’ Argument That The
Court’s Ruling Was Arbitrary Is Baseless

Even If this Court concludes that the district court did not admit testimony about
the standoff based on the res gestae exception to Rule 404(b), it should nevertheless
affirm the ruling on that ground, as well as on the “consciousness of guilt” ground. See
State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 388, 234 P.3d 707, 712 (2010) (affirming denial of
11

motion on correct theory, one not reached by trial court); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (if trial court reaches the correct result by incorrect
theory, appellate court will affirm upon the correct theory).
Here, “[t]he jury [was] entitled to base its decision upon a full and accurate
description of the events concerning the whole criminal act,” Izatt, 96 Idaho at 670, 534
P.2d at 1110. Sams’ refusal to exit the house and allow police to communicate with him
followed his offense uninterrupted. Sams’ attempt to avoid law enforcement after they
responded to the scene of the reported assault, and his arrest upon exiting the house
hours later, were necessary facts to give the jury the complete story of events
surrounding Sams’ offenses. Under the res gestae exception to Rule 404(b), the district
court’s ruling that the state could present testimony about Sams’ refusal to leave his
house and how he was later taken into custody was correct.
Also, as the prosecutor and court concluded, Sams’ delay in leaving his house
for hours when police responded tended to show his “consciousness of guilt,” a ruling
which Sams has not challenged on appeal. (Tr., p.110, L.25 – p.111, L.5; p.119, Ls.24.) See State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 544, 285 P.3d 348, 359 (Ct. App. 2012)
(citation omitted) (“Evidence of flight, escape, or failure to appear on the part of a
defendant is often identified as relevant to demonstrate consciousness of guilt.”) In
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998), the Idaho Supreme
Court explained:
“For departure to take on the legal significance of flight, there must be
other circumstances present and unexplained which, together with the
departure, reasonably justify an inference that it was done with a
consciousness of guilt and in an effort to avoid apprehension or
prosecution based on that guilt.” Wrenn at 509, 584 P.2d at 1234. The
12

holding in Wrenn contains no requirement that the departure be either
immediate or concealed. In the present case, upon learning that police
wanted to talk to him about the alleged sexual abuse of S.K., Moore
immediately left Idaho and returned to Oregon, giving his employer a false
reason to explain his sudden departure. These actions reasonably imply a
consciousness of guilt and a desire to flee the jurisdiction in order to avoid
prosecution.
(Quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 509, 584 P.2d 1231, 1233 (1978)).
Sams’ actions of staying inside his house for five hours and refusing to answer
phone calls from police – even from a phone thrown through a window – “reasonably
justify an inference that it was done with a consciousness of guilt and in an effort to
avoid apprehension or prosecution based on that guilt.”2

Id.

Sams has failed to

challenge, much less show error in the district court’s admission of limited testimony
about the “standoff” on the ground that such testimony was relevant to show Sams’
consciousness of guilt.
Instead of addressing the “res gestae” or “consciousness of guilt” bases for the
district court’s ruling, Sams argues that the district court’s admission of “standoff”
testimony as non-404(b) evidence was arbitrary, explaining:
The district court’s ruling that the standoff evidence was admissible as
Rule 404(b) evidence stood until the court was presented with the State’s
failure to serve notice, which would render the evidence inadmissible.
[Citation omitted.] The district court then determined the evidence was
admissible because it was not Rule 404(b) evidence. The district court’s
flip-flopping on whether the standoff evidence was Rule 404(b) evidence
was arbitrary, and thus outside the boundaries of the district court’s
discretion.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.15.)

2

The district court also concluded that admission of the “standoff” testimony was not
unduly prejudicial under Rule 403, adding that “[i]t is part and parcel of the offense[.]”
(Tr., p.113, L.22 – p.114, L.6.) Sams has not challenged that ruling on appeal.
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In short, Sams contends the district court’s final ruling was arbitrary because the
court “flip-flopped” about the Rule 404(b) basis it initially cited for admitting the
“standoff” evidence only after defense counsel confronted it with the “notice” problem.
However, the record shows the district court also based its initial ruling, in part, on the
res gestae principle (or “complete story principle,” or “part and parcel”).

(See Tr.,

p.114, Ls.4-6 (“It is part and parcel of the offense . . . .”).) Sams’ assertion that the court
resorted to the “not Rule 404(b) evidence” ground only because defense counsel
confronted it with the “notice” issue after the court’s initial ruling is not well-taken -- the
court’s initial ruling stated a “not Rule 404(b) evidence” basis (i.e., res gestae) for
admitting such testimony. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-15.) The notice issue merely
served to eliminate the 404(b) ground for admitting “standoff” testimony, but left the non404(b) grounds (i.e., res gestae and “consciousness of guilt”) intact. Moreover, the
court significantly limited what the state could present as res gestae and
“consciousness of guilt” to prevent any Rule 404(b) “bad acts” and any impermissible
“character” testimony. Sams has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s ruling
was arbitrary.
3.

Even If Admission Of Testimony About The Standoff Was Error, Such
Error Is Harmless

Even if the district court erred in admitting testimony about the “standoff,” the
testimony presented at trial by Officer Rush was harmless.
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected ….” I.R.E. 103(a). See also I.C.R. 52
(“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall
14

be disregarded.”). “An error is harmless if the reviewing court is able to declare beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” State v. Marmentini,
152 Idaho 269, 272, 270 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 219-220, 245 P.3d 961, 971-972 (2010)).
The following portion of Officer Rush’s testimony about the “standoff,” the only
such testimony presented at trial, was so innocuous it was clearly incapable of having
contributed to the verdict:
Q.

Officer Rush, now when you spoke to [T.O.] and another officer
spoke to [T.O.], you learned that there was another individual inside
the house; is that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Were attempts made to talk to that individual?

A.

Attempts were made; yes.

Q.

Now do you have that person’s name?

A.

I don’t recall if we did. I think we did at the time, but I wasn’t the
one who was attempting to contact him, so I don’t know if he was
attempting to communicate with him by name or not.

Q.

Thank you, sir.
Now were attempts made to have Mr. Sams come out – excuse me
– the defendant come out of the house at that particular juncture?

A.

Yes.
[Objection to leading question and ruling sustaining objection
omitted.]

Q.

Officer Rush, do you know whether attempts were made to contact
Mr. Sams at that point?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

Do you know whether contact was made with him at that point?

A.

Not initially; no.

Q.

You don’t know or there wasn’t contact?

A.

He did not respond to our attempts to contact him initially.

Q.

And so did you stand by that scene?

A.

I did; yes.

Q.

Now do you know whether or not contact was eventually made with
him?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. And did you have any contact with the defendant that day?

A.

Not until he was taken into custody.

Q.

But he did eventually exit the house?

A.

Yes, ma’am.

Q.

Thank you, sir.
Now was he placed into custody at that time?

A.

Yes; he was.

(Tr., p.205, L.16 - p.207, L.14.)
Officer Rush not only did not mention anything about the road blockage or SWAT
team, he did not even mention the length of time (i.e., five hours) Sams held out in his
house or that police officers threw a phone through a window of Sams’ house in an
unsuccessful attempt to talk to him. Rather, Officer Rush testified that “attempts were
made” to contact Sams, Sams “eventually” exited the house, and he “was placed into
custody at that time.” (Id.) The fact that the jury acquitted Sams of the two charged
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felonies indicates that the jury was not influenced by Officer Rush’s testimony about the
“standoff.” Coupled with the testimony about the behavior of Sams during the incident
with T.O., as set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, this Court should conclude that,
even if the district court’s ruling was erroneous, such error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered upon
the jury verdict finding Sams guilty of disturbing the peace.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2016.

_/s/ John C. McKinney_____
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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